



## SYNTHETIC DECOMPOSABLE OBJECTS

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**Abstract:** *All words have a minimal semantic content, that is, one or two basic semantic components that form part of each of their meanings and therefore must be reflected in any translation. In other words, it focuses on the attitude of the subjects who have mastered and used a particular sign system to this same sign system.*


**Key words:** *pragmatics, linguistic sciences, subjective, synthetic, decomposable objects, morph phonology, innovation, metatheoretical stance, talpragmaticism, semanticism.*

**Аннотация:** *Все слова обладают минимальным семантическим содержанием, то есть одним или двумя основными семантическими компонентами, входящими в состав каждого из их значений, и потому отражаются в любом переводе, который должен быть переведен. Иными словами, он фокусируется на отношении субъектов, использующих определенную знаковую систему, к этой же знаковой системе.*

**Ключевые слова:** *прагматика, лингвистические науки, субъективные, синтетические, разложимые объекты, морфофонология, инновация, метатеоретическая позиция, талпрагматизм, семантика.*

The first way to articulate the relationship concerns methodologies of, or metatheoretical stances toward, linguistic sciences. Clearly, they can be objective (deagentivized) or subjective (agentive), analytic (compositional) or synthetic (holistic), or various combinations thereof; but we may detect three ideal types in the recent history. The first of such types, best represented by the Chomsky approach and generally characterized by objective and analytic attitudes, is called “componential, compartmental, or ‘modular’” [2, 39]. It sees the linguistic sciences as analytic pursuits dealing with decomposable objects (i.e., modules) such as phonetics, phonology, morph phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics, naturalistically studied by compositional methods and described independently of the particular socio historical contexts in which analysts are involved as social agents. Clearly, this metatheoretical stance, which underlies the organizational institutions and academic curricula of linguistics, is typical of the modern sciences coming out of Baconian natural philosophy in 17th-century England [5, 88-131]. That is, it is the stance of the modern natural sciences, with their laws and other regularities, which try to explain empirically occurring phenomena by appealing to hypothetically idealized quasiempirical regularities(‘covering laws’) [5, 112] analytically abstracted from the to talcum texts of scientific activities, which are there by decomposed into distinct fields, in our case semantics and pragmatics.


This epistemological characterization may be supplemented with a pragmatic understanding of the social and historical processes of epistemic authorization [4, 78]. That



is, the componential stance toward language is pragmatically positioned in, and presupposingly indexes, the historical context of the post-Baconian specialized sciences and, more broadly, Durkheimian ‘organic society’ in modernity, or the age of social specialization and the division of labor. Because the truthfulness, appropriateness, and effectiveness of any actions, including scientific ones, depend on the contexts in which they take place, this implies that the componential stance and its ‘scientific’ results receive their authority primarily from the post-Baconian modernization project.

This project is characterized not only by social and epistemic specialization, but also by the standardizing regularization, methodical rationalization, and experimental controlling of contextual contingencies, chance happenings, and unique events, which earlier were understood as fate, epiphanies, and other phenomena originating in the heavenly universe, and transcending the sublunar, empirically manipulable space of human agency [5, 95-105]. Here, we must note that standardizing regularization, Saint-Simonian technocratic specialization, and Benthamite instrumental rationalization generally characterize the modern discipline of logic (or, when applied to linguistics, of formal syntax and semantics), which came to dominate American philosophy around 1900 and whose rise is precisely due to these social forces [6, 43-70].

First, as to the boundary between semantics and pragmatics, we may discern three approaches: semanticism, pragmatism, and complementary. Semanticism envisions pragmatics as the extension of semantically encoded yet metapragmatically characterizable categories (especially moods and *verba dicendi*, or verbs of saying), just as traditional logic has understood pragmatics (discourse) as the extensional universe onto which intentional (i.e., metasemantically characterizable) categories are projected. Naturally, semanticism is aligned with the decontextualized, analytic methodological perspective and sees language in use from the metasemantic perspective of the denotational code (linguistic structure) presupposingly used by language users, including linguistic scientists, to interpret the referential significances of discursive interactions in which they are involved as discourse participants. Hence, this approach, typically taken by the philosophers of language such as Austin and Searle, characteristically uses the method of ‘armchair’ introspection, in which only the presupposable (and referential) aspects of communicative processes may readily emerge. This approach generally excludes the social-indexical aspects of pragmatics, particularly as regards group identities and power relations among discourse participants and other contextual beings, inasmuch as these are created (vs. presupposed) in discursive interaction and only coincidentally, indirectly, or opaquely related to linguistic-structurally encoded symbols [5, 89-95]. In this approach, pragmatics is mostly reduced to metapragmatically characterizable types in what essentially is a semantic, denotational code; examples are mood /modality/tense categories, verbs of saying, pronouns, and other shifters (i.e., ‘denotational–indexical duplexes’; [3, 45-56]) or their psychological correlates, as observed in Austin’s ‘performative utterances’ and Searle’s ‘primary illocutionary forces,’ allegedly underlying the perlocutionary effects regularly created by the indirect (nonliteral).



use of the tokens of such types (Deixis and Anaphora: Pragmatic Approaches; Speech Acts; Austin, John Lang Shaw (1911–1960)). Thus far, we have explored how the three methodological stances are related to how we define the disciplinary boundaries and noted the correspondence between the methodological scale, stretching from componentialism to perspectivalism to critical pragmatism, and another scale, extending from semanticism to complementarism, reductionistic pragmatism, and to talpragmatism.

Again, let us start with Kant's critical turn, which yielded two traditions: the semantic and the socialscientific (i.e., pragmatic). Whereas Kant's central concerns were '(re)cognition' and 'judgment,' behind which the problematics of 'meaning' and 'language' were still hidden [4], Frege's (1848–1925) later discovery of predicate logic replaced the Kantian notion of synthetic judgment (or value) with analytic logic and the notions of proposition and sentence, further divided into 'force' (assertoric, interrogative, imperative, and so on) and propositional content (represented by structurally decomposable units such as the subject, predicate, and their subcategories).

**Meaning** is one of the most controversial terms in the theory of language. At first sight the understanding of this term seems to present no difficulty at all—it is freely used in teaching, interpreting and translation. The scientific definition of **meaning** however just as the definition of some other basic linguistic terms, such as **word**, **sentence**, etc., has been the issue of interminable discussions. Since there is no universally accepted definition of meaning<sup>1</sup> we shall confine ourselves to a brief survey of the problem as it is viewed in modern linguistics both in our country and elsewhere.

Some critics believe that the cognitive function of a text is more important than its persuasive (or expressive) function; that whilst in translation cognitive (i. e. extra linguistic) accuracy can and must always be achieved, the other factor, the connotative, lexical, stylistic or pragmatic, defies accuracy, and is therefore secondary. K. Baldinger has referred to it as a "halo" round the conceptual of content; A. Neubert states that only the "pragmatic" is untranslatable. This widespread idea appears mistaken to me; a glance at the entries for, say, "Munich" or "Hitler" in, say, the Petit Larousse or the Quillet- Flammarion suggests that lexicographers tend to leave out the most important facts [5, 186-189].


The Limits of word Meaning for Accuracy's sake.

A word can mean anything at all under the following conditions:

- a) that it has a stipulate license to do so;
- b) that it forms part of a special code;

In all the above cases, the translator still has to discover the word's meaning. However, under normal circumstances, the meaning of a word can never be wholly dictated or conditioned by its linguistic or situational context. The semantic contours of conceptual terms are often vaguer and wider, but system must not be translated as "arrangement", unless as part of a recognized collocation.

Theoretically, at any rate, all words have a minimum semantic content, that is one or two primary semantic components which form part of each of their meanings, and which must



therefore be "transferred" in any translation; these are the boundaries of translation, beyond which translation becomes paraphrase.

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