RANKING METHODOLOGIES AS MARKET SIGNALS: HOW UNIVERSITY PERFORMANCE METRICS SHAPE STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR IN EMERGING MARKETS
Keywords:
signaling theory, university rankings, market mechanisms, information asymmetry, emerging marketsAbstract
This paper applies signaling theory to analyze how international university rankings function as market mechanisms shaping institutional behavior in emerging economies. Using comparative analysis of THE and QS methodologies, the study reveals that rankings create information asymmetries favoring established institutions while disadvantaging newcomers. The research examines how Uzbekistan’s higher education reforms, particularly Presidential Decree PQ-151, attempt to overcome these market failures through strategic interventions. Findings indicate that ranking methodologies generate specific incentive structures: THE’s balanced approach encourages comprehensive development, while QS’s reputation emphasis creates barriers for young universities. The paper contributes to economic theory by demonstrating how rankings function as imperfect market signals, creating both efficiency gains through competition and market distortions through measurement limitations. Policy implications suggest that emerging market universities require compensatory mechanisms to compete effectively in ranking-mediated markets.
References
1. M. Espeland and M. Sauder, "Rankings and reactivity," American Journal of Sociology, vol. 113, no. 1, pp. 1-40, 2007.
2. M. Spence, "Job market signaling," Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 87, no. 3, pp. 355-374, 1973.
3. B. Cantwell and I. Kauppinen, Eds., Academic Capitalism in the Age of Globalization. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2014.
4. E. Hazelkorn, Rankings and the Reshaping of Higher Education, 2nd ed. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.
5. Republic of Uzbekistan, "Concept for Development of Higher Education System until 2030," Presidential Decree UP-5847, 2019.